Bangladesh’s Cycle of Political Violence: Two Decades of Bloodshed, Changing Governments and Local Power Struggles

From intra-party rivalries and electoral clashes to battles over land, businesses and political influence, violence has persisted across successive governments. Recent killings involving BNP supporters highlight how little has changed at the grassroots level despite major political upheavals.

A group of men armed with sharp weapons chased Ripon Mia in the Paiska area of Narayanganj on the night of October 18. They eventually caught up with him and hacked him, leaving him critically injured. Family members rushed him to hospital, where doctors declared him dead.

Ripon was a local leader of the Bangladesh Jatiyatabadi Jubo Dal, the youth wing of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).

According to local BNP activists, tensions had recently escalated between two rival groups over whose name should appear on the guest list for a religious programme. The dispute may have been behind the killing.

Ripon's daughter, Shila, said: "Several people chased my father and hacked him with sharp weapons."

The local BNP president attributed the killing to a dispute over political dominance in the area.

The incident is not isolated. On February 28 this year, two brothers were killed in a clash between supporters of the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami in Chuadanga.

Police said the confrontation began with an argument after iftar during Ramadan. Hafizur Rahman died several hours after the clash. His brother, Mofizur Rahman, a local Jamaat leader, died on March 10 while receiving treatment at a hospital in Dhaka.

The BNP and Jamaat blamed each other for the violence. Following a murder case filed by the victims' family, police arrested three people. Among those arrested were a local BNP leader and a former leader of the party's volunteer organisation.

The clash occurred less than two weeks after the BNP formed the government following the national election.

More than two decades of political violence

These recent killings are part of a much longer history of political violence in Bangladesh.

A review of records, research and media reports published by Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK), a leading Bangladeshi human rights organisation, reveals a pattern of political conflict spanning more than two decades. Clashes between rival political parties, internal factional disputes and election-related violence have occurred under successive governments.

According to ASK, between January and September this year, Bangladesh recorded 467 incidents of political violence, leaving 94 people dead and 3,587 injured.

Of these incidents, 112 involved clashes between rival factions of the BNP. Those confrontations resulted in 18 deaths and 1,215 injuries.

The figures cover incidents during both the interim administration and the elected government. BNP Chairman Tarique Rahman assumed office as prime minister on February 17.

Bangladesh's political landscape has undergone major transformations in recent years. In the summer of 2024, a mass uprising brought down the government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, ending her 15-year rule, which had been widely characterised as authoritarian.

An interim administration, largely composed of individuals from outside mainstream party politics, subsequently took charge. A national election was later held, paving the way for the return of an elected political government.

Yet one feature of the country's political landscape has remained remarkably persistent: deadly conflicts over who controls local areas and their economic and political resources.

Political violence is not confined to any single administration. It has continued through successive governments and major political transitions.

Historical data dating back to 2002 reveal a recurring pattern. Clashes between rival parties, factional disputes within governing parties and election-related violence have been persistent features of Bangladeshi politics.

At the local level, disputes over party positions, businesses, land and even guest lists for social or religious events can become flashpoints in struggles for influence and dominance.

Political violence goes beyond BNP-Awami League rivalry

An examination of Bangladesh's political violence reveals that the problem cannot be explained solely through the rivalry between the BNP and the now-ousted Awami League.

ASK statistics covering 2002 to 2006 show that 284 incidents of internal conflict occurred within the BNP during that period, resulting in 55 deaths. Internal clashes within the Awami League claimed another 37 lives.

These figures were cited in political scientist Rounaq Jahan's 2014 research paper, Political Parties in Bangladesh.

The findings also highlight the complicated relationship between the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami, an Islamist political party that was part of the four-party alliance led by the BNP during its 2001-2006 tenure.

Jamaat had two representatives in the cabinet of that government. Despite their participation in the same governing coalition, clashes between supporters of the BNP and Jamaat continued.

According to ASK data cited in Jahan's research, 134 clashes occurred between the BNP and Jamaat from 2002 to 2006, leaving eight people dead.

During the same period, 42 clashes between the Awami League and Jamaat resulted in seven deaths.

The figures demonstrate that political violence was not limited to confrontations between the two principal rival parties. Conflicts also occurred between political allies and within individual organisations.

Fewer clashes under the caretaker government, but repression continued

Political clashes declined significantly during 2007 and 2008, when a military-backed caretaker administration governed Bangladesh.

During those two years, only eight incidents of internal BNP conflict were recorded, resulting in two deaths. The Awami League recorded one internal clash, with no fatalities.

Clashes between rival political parties also fell to 32 incidents, resulting in seven deaths. All seven fatalities occurred in confrontations between the Awami League and the BNP.

By comparison, clashes between the two parties alone claimed 118 lives between 2002 and 2006.

Overall, nine people died in political violence in 2007 and 2008.

However, the decline in clashes between political parties did not mean that political repression had disappeared.

Human Rights Watch documented arbitrary arrests, torture and deaths in custody during the caretaker administration, which governed under a state of emergency.

Political activities were also restricted. As a result, both the opportunities for political mobilisation and the environment in which parties could organise rallies, meetings and confrontations changed significantly.

The lower number of recorded political clashes must therefore be understood in the context of restrictions on political activity and the broader political environment of the period.

Internal violence increased after the Awami League returned to power

After the Awami League returned to government in 2009, internal conflicts within the party increased substantially.

Between 2009 and 2012, the Awami League recorded 799 internal clashes, resulting in 97 deaths.

During the same period, 229 internal BNP clashes were recorded, leaving 21 people dead.

The time periods and political circumstances underlying these figures are not identical across all administrations. The purpose of examining them is not to establish a ranking between governments but to highlight the recurrence of internal factional violence, particularly within parties in power.

While local disputes over influence regularly produced violence, the death toll rose even further during periods of major national political confrontation.

In 2013, political tensions intensified ahead of a controversial national election.

According to ASK, 507 people were killed in political violence that year.

The organisation's annual records attributed 185 deaths to violence surrounding nationwide strikes, or hartals. Another 85 people were killed in connection with the blockade programme that began on November 26.

Violent confrontations involving Jamaat-e-Islami and law enforcement agencies also became a major feature of the political crisis during the Awami League government.

ASK's main annual records listed 37 deaths in clashes involving Jamaat, its student wing Islami Chhatra Shibir and the police. A separate category for clashes between Jamaat and police recorded another 11 deaths.

Other categories involving Jamaat or Shibir included:

• 13 deaths in clashes involving the Awami League, Jamaat and Shibir.
• Nine deaths in confrontations between the Awami League and Jamaat.
• Nine deaths in clashes between Shibir and police.
• Five deaths in clashes involving the Awami League, BNP, Jamaat and police.

Several other smaller categories also recorded fatalities.

Taken together, different categories of clashes involving Jamaat or Shibir accounted for 96 of the 507 deaths recorded in political violence in 2013.

These classifications identify the parties involved in reported confrontations; they do not, by themselves, establish responsibility for individual deaths.

In subsequent years, the number of reported clashes involving Jamaat and Shibir declined.

In 2015, nine incidents involving either organisation resulted in three deaths. In 2016, two such clashes left one person dead.

The 2017 records included one confrontation between Shibir and police, in which three people were injured.

Jamaat and Shibir were not separately identified in the relevant categories in the 2018 and 2019 annual records. Their absence from those classifications does not necessarily establish that no incidents involving the organisations occurred.

Internal clashes continued even without major national confrontations

Political violence has not been limited to periods of national crises or intense rivalry between opposing parties.

In 2017, ASK recorded 52 deaths in political violence. Of these, 29 people were killed in internal clashes within the Awami League alone.

However, this figure did not include fatalities recorded separately in clashes involving the party's student and youth organisations.

Local government elections have also emerged as a major source of political violence.

Union Parishad elections, which are held every five years, have frequently triggered confrontations over local political control.

In 2016, violence surrounding Union Parishad elections resulted in 147 deaths. Out of 177 people killed in political violence across the country that year, most fatalities were linked to the local government polls.

A similar pattern emerged in 2021, when 113 people were killed in clashes connected to Union Parishad elections.

The total number of deaths from political violence that year stood at 157, according to ASK.

These figures do not identify the perpetrators in every killing. However, they demonstrate that political violence is not restricted to parliamentary elections. Competition over local offices, influence and the distribution of power can also produce deadly confrontations.

Struggles over local dominance and economic interests

Research into political violence in Bangladesh has also highlighted the importance of local power struggles.

A study by the BRAC Institute of Governance and Development examined political violence reported in the media between 2008 and 2013.

Its analysis of incidents between 2008 and 2012 identified struggles for dominance within political parties as the leading cause of violence.

Disputes over government contracts, property, land and employment also emerged as significant triggers.

The study used its own database, so its figures cannot be directly combined with ASK's statistics. Nevertheless, its findings offer important insights into the underlying dynamics of political violence.

Political organisations provide opportunities to compete for leadership positions and influence over supporters. They also allow local leaders to establish connections with people involved in government decision-making.

When such connections can be used to secure income, protect business interests or gain access to economic opportunities, internal party competition becomes about much more than winning the next election.

Control over political organisations can translate into control over local resources and commercial opportunities.

The fall of the Awami League did not end local power struggles

The fall of Sheikh Hasina's government in August 2024 ended the Awami League's long period in power and created expectations of a new political order.

Following the mass uprising, student leaders and political figures spoke of building a "New Bangladesh".

Yet the change of government did not eliminate local conflicts over political influence and economic interests.

Although patterns of violence have varied under different administrations, it is important to distinguish between different forms of political violence.

In particular, the violence surrounding the fall of the Hasina government should not be conflated with routine factional clashes within political parties.

A United Nations human rights investigation into the events of July and August 2024 documented systematic human rights violations involving the former government, security forces and violent groups associated with the Awami League.

In a report published in February 2025, the UN investigation estimated that as many as 1,400 people may have been killed during the crackdown on the protests.

The report also identified the use of state violence against protesters as part of a broader policy of repression.

Separately, ASK's general annual records for 2024 listed 100 deaths from political violence. However, this figure does not represent the total number of people killed during the mass uprising.

The organisation monitored deaths during the uprising separately. Treating the 100 deaths in its general political violence records as the total death toll of the uprising would therefore obscure the scale of the crackdown.

After the Awami League lost power, competition emerged over various local positions, businesses and commercial networks previously controlled by individuals associated with the party.

In several areas, the resulting disputes involved rival factions of other political organisations.

Clashes over business and land control in Chattogram

Chattogram provides a notable example of how struggles over local influence and commercial interests can turn deadly.

On September 20, 2024, BNP factional violence in the city's Chandgaon area resulted in the stabbing death of Jubayer Uddin Babu.

Police said the two groups had been involved in a dispute over control of an artificial turf football field.

The newspaper Prothom Alo investigated 15 incidents involving killings, attacks, clashes and land grabbing in Chattogram.

Its investigation found that following the change of government, control over several sources of illicit income shifted from one group to another.

The disputes were linked to transport operations, markets, land and railway contracting businesses.

Allegations also emerged that BNP leaders and activists were attempting to take control of networks previously dominated by individuals associated with the Awami League.

These developments took place during the interim administration led by Muhammad Yunus, before the BNP returned to national power.

After the Awami League lost office, internal clashes within the BNP also became a major source of political fatalities.

Even before the party formed the government, ASK recorded 192 clashes between rival BNP factions in 2025.

Forty people were killed in those incidents.

Another eight people died in internal clashes involving the Jubo Dal, the BNP's youth wing.

Overall, ASK recorded 401 incidents of political violence in 2025, resulting in 102 deaths.

A new political party also faces allegations of involvement in clashes

Student leaders who played a leading role in the 2024 mass uprising formed the National Citizen Party (NCP) in February 2025.

The party emerged with a promise to offer an alternative to the long-established political order dominated by the BNP and the Awami League.

However, records of political violence also show clashes involving the new party.

In 2025, nine incidents involving the NCP resulted in five deaths and 171 injuries.

Between January and September 2026, another 29 incidents involving the party were recorded, leaving 220 people injured.

Most of these confrontations were reportedly with the BNP.

Internal BNP violence had also continued before the party formed the government.

Competition over local influence and control of businesses previously associated with Awami League supporters contributed to disputes between rival groups.

In some cases, individuals who had spent years working alongside one another politically became involved in deadly confrontations.

On March 8, 2025, a clash between two BNP factions in Chuadanga resulted in the death of Rafiqul Islam, a former local organising secretary of the party.

He ran a small shop, while his wife, Nahida Khatun, worked at a local clinic.

Following his killing, Nahida filed a murder case naming 36 people, including the president and general secretary of the local BNP unit.

According to Nahida, her husband had been unable to return home for years because of politically motivated cases against him.

Eventually, she said, he was killed by members of his own party.

"He was killed by people from his own party," she said.

BNP-Jamaat clashes also increase

Statistics from 2025 and 2026 indicate that confrontations between BNP and Jamaat supporters have also continued.

According to ASK, 33 clashes between the two parties in 2025 resulted in three deaths and 520 injuries.

Between January and September 2026, the number of such clashes rose to 137.

Those incidents left 10 people dead and 1,054 injured.

Although the 2026 figures cover a shorter period, both the number of clashes and the death toll were higher than the corresponding figures for the whole of 2025.

ASK's records for January to September 2026 also listed 51 deaths under a separate category titled "attacks and shootings by miscreants".

The BNP government faces questions over accountability

Since the BNP returned to power in February this year, responsibility for maintaining law and order has rested directly with its government.

Party leaders have acknowledged the need to address violence, extortion and illegal land grabbing.

At a parliamentary party meeting in October, Tarique Rahman warned against extortion and land grabbing.

He said even members of parliament would be held accountable if they became involved in such activities.

Police have also rejected the idea that political affiliation provides immunity from legal action.

The police commissioner of Chattogram said cases were being filed and arrests made without considering the political identities of those involved.

However, investigations by Prothom Alo have identified incidents in which disciplinary action by political parties, including expulsions and the dissolution of local committees, appeared to take the place of formal legal action.

This has raised questions about whether internal party discipline is being used as a substitute for criminal accountability.

The cycle of political violence

In a 2009 study titled Party Politics and Political Violence in Bangladesh: Issues, Manifestation and Consequences, political scientist M. Moniruzzaman examined the recurring nature of political violence in the country.

Published in the journal South Asian Survey, the research described political violence as a self-reinforcing cycle.

According to the study, confrontations deepen hostility between political parties and make compromise increasingly difficult.

Governments in power use state institutions to suppress political opponents, while opposition parties respond with further protests and confrontational political activities.

In this way, violence becomes both a consequence of political conflict and a mechanism that perpetuates it.

The study also highlighted the long-term consequences of repeated political violence.

When confrontations become commonplace, younger generations of political activists may begin to regard the use of force as a normal means of achieving political objectives.

Student and labour organisations can help spread such practices across educational institutions, workplaces and the streets.

Moniruzzaman argued that this weakens the democratic values necessary for a functioning political system, including tolerance, accountability and respect for opposing views.

Bangladesh's experience over the past two decades reflects several recurring patterns.

The nature of political violence has changed under successive governments. National political confrontations and election-related disputes have often been accompanied by sharp increases in fatalities.

At other times, internal clashes within governing parties have also claimed large numbers of lives.

The continuation of such violence during the interim administration demonstrates that changing national leadership alone cannot resolve disputes over local political positions, businesses, land and economic resources.

The BNP's return to power has not brought an end to internal factional conflicts. Instead, the party now faces the direct responsibility of addressing the violence and enforcing the rule of law.

Although expulsions and police arrests have been reported in response to some incidents, the persistence of killings across successive political transitions raises a fundamental question: has the country's political culture changed, or have only the groups competing for power changed?

For Bangladesh, the challenge extends beyond changing governments or replacing political leaders. It involves dismantling the local networks of influence, patronage and economic control that have repeatedly turned political competition into deadly violence.

Without effective law enforcement, accountability regardless of political affiliation, and meaningful changes in the relationship between political power and economic interests, the cycle may continue under yet another political administration.